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In reasoning, the Lords made a distinction betwixt a right to wear arms and matriculation. His power to new armorial bearings is merely discretionary and ministerial, and with that this Court cannot interfere.

The statutory basis for the jurisdiction of the Lyon King of Arms consists mainly of three Acts of the Scottish Parliament, of 1587, 15. (He grants them now to some who were: in possession of them of old.). Pleaded at discussing for the Lyon:the advocation is incompetent; his jurisdiction, as to arms, is privative and independent.

(The Act of the British Parliament of 1867 mainly reorganized the Court and set the salaries of the Scottish officers of arms). But the gentlemen answer, that Lords at the beginning, having been only Barons, and in regard of the considerable interest they hid in their respective shires, being commissionate from the small barons and freeholders to represent them in Parliament, they, because of that credit, got first the denomination of Lords, without any patent or creation; and, upon the matter, were nothing but Barons: and so what is due to them is also due to the other, they originally not differing from the rest by any essential or superior step of dignity. REPLIED, Whatever was their rise, the other Barons have clearly acknowledged a distinction now; in so far as they have renounced their privilege of coming to Parliaments by the 113 act in 1587; and the distinction being made, and their privileges renounced, by the small Barons in the Parliament 1427. See also Morison's Dictionary, 7656; Decisions of the Court of Session. But Lord Hailes, 30th November 1774, "Repelled the declinature, and sustained the jurisdiction of the Court of Session: Found the advocation competent in respect that the question at issue was a civil cause; neither is there any statute pointed out by the pursuer whereby the radical or consuetudinary jurisdiction of the Court of Session in matters of this sort, stands abolished;" and, 26th July 1775, the Lords adhered.

20th December 1776, the Lords refused a reclaiming petition without answers, and adhered. The Laird of Dundas complained to the Lyon, That Dundas of Fingask had got from the Lyon's predecessor, in the year 1744, a grant of an armorial bearing, to which he and his predecessor had right many ages before. In 1791 he executed a deed, where, after making some alterations, but none on this clause, "he approves of the foresaid deed of entail, in all the other articles and clauses thereof." At the time, however, when he executed this last deed, the rental of the estate exceeded £. had thereby revoked the above-cited clause; and that, therefore, the pursuer should be at liberty to keep up and augment the rent of the entailed estate, as freely as if it had not been inserted. There is no conclusion in favour of his right to these arms; so that, were he to obtain decree in terms of his libel, he could take nothing under it.

And again, 25th June 1778, the Lords, on report of Lord Hailes, found that the Lyon can exact no higher fees for Mr Murray of Touchadam's arms than ten merks, being the fees exigible by the statute 1672 from a baron; and found the Lyon liable in the expense of process prior to the last remit, and of the whole extract of the decreet. The matter was brought before the Lords by an advocation at the instance of Fingask. In support of this conclusion he Pleaded: As the clause in question has been so far infringed by the entailer himself that it cannot be complied with in terminis, it must be wholly at an end. Popular actions are unknown in our law, and no one can bring an action to take from another what he himself has no right to.

the state of the register of the Lyon-office, as set forth by the Procurator-fiscal himself, finds, That the said register affords not sufficient evidence as to what armorial bearings have been matriculated by the Lyon, and what not:1mo, Because the register is so framed that any chasms therein cannot ex facie be discerned ; 2do, Because it is admitted that the armorial bearings of certain persons matriculated did not appear. That the act 1672 neither made the jurisdiction of the Lyon Court privative, nor took away the power of reviewing all the proceedings of the Lord Lyon; 3.

therein till of late: that the present Lord Lyon has become more attentive to the duties of his office than his predecessors ; and, therefore, finds, That it is not proved whether the armorial bearings of. That, at all events, this Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction in all competitions of arms, as they in reality raised questions of patrimonial interest. The question taken to report is merely in regard to the jurisdiction of this Court, in determining which it is necessary to consider the nature of the Lord Lyon's powers.

were in public possession of a coat armorial in 15, long prior to the Act of Parliament 1592: finds that this public possession has been continued in the family of the Murrays of Touchadam unto the present times, with respect to charge, as well as with respect to field: finds, that it must be presumed, since no evidence is offered to the contrary, that the colours of field and charge were the same anciently as now: finds it proved, by the evidence produced, or referred to, and not contradicted, that, ever since the year 1660, the family of Murray of Touchadam has been wont to give or bear the supporters, crest, and device which the said William Murray now gives or bears: finds, that such long possession infers an antecedent right, or excludes all challenge on account of defect of such antecedent right : finds,that although the Procurator-fiscal has been called upon, by an interlocutor of the Ordinary, specially to set forth whether it is proposed to matriculate the arms of William Murray of Touchadam as of one entitled to bear arms on matriculation, or to give arms to him as a well-deserving person, in terms of the Act 1672; and of the former, is proposed, what are the arms which Murray of Touchadam ought to bear on matriculation ;yet that he refuses to make any answer to this question, which is plain, and can be answered by any one, versant in the science of heraldry : Therefore, and upon the whole, finds, That the representative of the family of Touchadam was entitled to be matriculated, in terms of the statute 15, for the armorial bearings whereof William Murray of Touchadam, raiser of the advocation, is in possession. It was pleaded in limine that the action was incompetent before the Court. Lyon), before answer as to the pursuer's title, made avizandum with the cause to the Lords of the Second Division of the Court, and ordained parties' procurators to prepare informations thereon as to the competency of the action in this Court." Informations were accordingly lodged, in which the pursuer pleaded, 1.

And having considered the original precept or summons at the instance of the Lord Lyon and the Procurator-fiscal of Court against the said William Murray, finds, That the conclusions thereof are altogether penal ; and having considered. that prior to 1672, the Lyon had no jurisdiction in matters of arms, the cognisance of which belonged solely to the Privy Council, and the Supreme Civil Court, which had also the power of reviewing all the proceedingsof the Lord Lyon; 2.

By taking a higher rent himself, he exercised the right of an unlimited proprietor; but did nothing which was inconsistent with his intention of circumscribing the powers of his successors. In the case of Murray it was found that the Lyon's jurisdiction was not privative, and this implies that the Court of Session has such a jurisdiction; that a question of this nature, while depending in the Lyon Court, may be brought here by advocation, or, after the thing is done, by reduction; and this I hold to be a well-founded doctrine.

The surplus rent, which he himself stipulated, may no doubt be levied by the Pursuer; but were he to renew the current leases, without confining the rent of the whole estate to £.1000, as he would then, by a voluntary act of his own, be violating the terms of the entail he would be guilty of an act of contravention. After a good deal of reasoning, the Court came to be of opinion, That the clause was to be held as discharged by the entailer, rebus ipsis et factis. We ought therefore to repel the defence so far as founded on defect of jurisdiction, and remit to the Ordinary [Lyon] to hear on the objections to the title and libel.

They thought the plea, so far as concerned the matriculation-fees, not improper; as the statute was so ancient, and the practice for at least twenty years against it, though not uniform. Dundas disputed the competency; but this plea was soon abandoned, and on the merits the Lords, 22d January 1762 pronounced this interlocutor: " Finds, That George Dundas of Dundas, heir-male of James Dundas of that ilk, who was forfeited in the year 1449, but afterwards rehabilitate, has the sole right to use and bear the coat of arms belonging to Dundas of that ilk, as matriculated in the register, authenticated by the subscription of Sir James Balfour then Lord Lyon ; and find, That the coat of arms obtained in the 1744, by Thomas Dundas, defender, from the late Lord Lyon,, was obtained by obreption, and that he has no right to use the same; and therefore ordain the said coat of arms to be recalled and expunged from the Lord Lyon's books, reserving to the said Thomas Dundas to apply for a new coat of arms, as accords: Find the defender Thomas Dundas of Fingask, and Thomas Dundas of Quanal, liable to the pursuer in the expense of the complaint before the Lord Lyon's court, and in the expense of this process of advocation," &c. It does not prohibit the entailer from maintaining the rental as he found it ; and it would not be the prohibition in the entail, but a new and a different one, which would restrain the heir in possession from increasing it still farther, at the expiration of the current leases. Moir, revoking certain clauses of his entail, and approving of all the others, at a period when he had raised his rental to above £.1000, precludes any presumption that he meant to recal the condition in question. I.) as analogous to the present; and as suggesting, the condition in question should be so modified by the Court as to make it consistent with the law of the land. I also doubt whether this Court has any original jurisdiction in matters of this kind, and whether it was not necessary for the pursuer to have applied to the Lord Lyon for redress, and on that being refused, to bring the judgment under review of this Court. There are in this case separate defences as to the competency and as to the title, and the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor is before answer as to the title.